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ABSTRACT. Classic theories of nationalism, whether modernist or ethnosymbolist,
emphasise the role of elites and spread of a common imagined community from centre to
periphery. Recent work across a range of disciplines challenges this account by stressing
the role of horizontal, peer-to-peer, dynamics alongside top-down ﬂows. Complexity
theory, which has recently been applied to the social sciences, expands our understand-
ing of horizontal national dynamics. It draws together contemporary critiques,
suggesting that researchers focus on the network properties of nations and
nationalism. It stresses that order may emerge from chaos; hence, ‘national’ behaviour
may appear without an imagined community. Treating nations like complex systems
whose form emerges from below should focus research on four central aspects of
complexity: emergence, feedback loops, tipping points and distributed knowledge, or
‘the wisdom of crowds’. This illuminates how national identity can be reproduced by
popular activities rather than the state; why nationalist ideas may gestate in small
circles for long periods, then suddenly spread; why secession is often contagious; and
why wide local variation in the content of national identity strengthens rather than
weakens the nation's power to mobilise.
KEYWORDS: complexity theory, everyday nationalism, local nationalism,
multivocalism, multivocality, nationalism from below, nationalism theory, personal na-
tionalism, popular nationalism, tipping point
This paper argues that complexity theory – the notion that complex social
phenomena may emerge from seemingly uncoordinated individual acts – can
enhance our understanding of national identity, nationalism and ethnic con-
ﬂict. The familiar modernist-ethnosymbolist (or constructivist-perennialist)
theoretical axis is crosscut by a vertical (‘top-down’) vs. horizontal (‘bottom-
up’) dimension. While this is not a new insight, the properties and network
dynamics of ‘horizontal’ processes of nationalism are not well understood.
Complexity theory sheds light on the importance of such dynamics in
explaining the spread of national constructs and nationalism. It illuminates
and links a series of puzzling phenomena in the study of nationalism, notably
variation in the content and interpretation of national identity between
people, groups and places; sudden, apparently inexplicable increases in
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nationalist fervour over time; and why certain national constructions and
movements succeed while others fail to reach a critical mass. It generates
new questions and explanatory frameworks for empirical researchers to
advance the ﬁeld.
Complexity theory addresses the very essence of what constitutes the
nation. The vertical, elite-diffusion model, which envisions the nation as a net-
work of individuals connected to elite nodes, has been challenged by a series of
critiques from scholars of everyday nationalism. These intimate ‘spontaneous’
peer-to-peer networks are as or more important as vertical networks in the
construction and replication of nations. If nations are vertically constituted,
their symbolic corpus can be read off elite documents and pronouncements.
If they are horizontally constructed, the content of national symbols exists
everywhere and nowhere: it cannot be located in an individual or document
but, like a forest or ﬂock of birds, lives as a complex whole, emerging from
the interaction of individuals, groups and institutions. Its shape can only be
grasped by interrogating a large number of individuals, institutions and
groups.
Complexity theory links hitherto disparate meso-level literatures on every-
day nationalism, multivocality, contested nationalism, personal nationalism,
tipping points and nationalism as local metaphor. In so doing, it connects mid-
dle-range concepts with macro-theoretical debates in the social sciences. More
than that, it opens up new avenues of empirical enquiry and assists those who
research nationalism ‘from below’ to better understand their data. Work on ev-
eryday nationalism, or nationalism ‘from below’, has drawn our attention to
the limitations of theories based on a top-down model whereby elite ideas
and power structures diffuse ideas of nationhood down the social scale and
out to peripheries. The state is the most prominent elite node, but separatist
elites and intellectuals can be viewed in a similar light – as central nodes whose
ideas ﬂow vertically downward to inﬂuence the masses. While this model is
most prominent in modernist accounts focusing on state or sub-state elites in
provincial jurisdictions (i.e. Breuilly 1993; Gellner 1983; Giddens 1994), it also
plays an important part in ethnosymbolist work focusing on romantic intellec-
tuals as the principal actors (Smith 1986; Hutchinson 1987). Complexity the-
ory thus expands upon the ‘horizontal’ pole of the horizontal–vertical
dimension that cross-cuts the modernism-ethnosymbolism axis in nationalism
theory.
Complexity and nationalism theory
Eric Hobsbawm had a keen ear for nationalism's horizontal and vertical
cadences. Yet he remained elliptical on the subject. For Hobsbawm, ‘practices
ﬁltering downwards…were probably predominant in this period [ﬁn de siècle
Europe]’. Yet he writes of working-class invented traditions such as football,
which ‘owed nothing to models from higher social classes’. At the conclusion
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of his essay on invented traditions, Hobsbawm is remarkably noncommittal,
raising more questions than answers:
The ﬁnal aspect is the relation between ‘invention’ and ‘spontaneous generation’… This
is something which constantly puzzles observers in modern mass societies. ‘Invented
tradition[s]’ have signiﬁcant social and political functions and would neither come into
existence nor establish themselves if they could not acquire them. Yet how far are they
manipulable? The politics of German nationalism in the Second Empire cannot be
understood only from above. It has been suggested that to some extent nationalism
escaped from the control of those who found it advantageous to manipulate it (Hobsbawm
1983:306–7, emphasis added)
Or, writing somewhat later,
‘With Gellner I would stress the element of artifact, invention and social engineering
which enters into the making of nations.’ Having said this, he concluded that ‘If I have
a major criticism of Gellner's work it is that his preferred perspective of modernization
from above, makes it difﬁcult to pay adequate attention to the view from below….
Ofﬁcial ideologies of states and movements are not guides to what is in the minds of
even the most loyal citizens or supporters… national identiﬁcation and what it is
believed to imply, can change and shift in time.’ (Hobsbawm 1990: 10–1).
Hobsbawm's work inﬂuenced that of Brubaker (1996) whose team undertook
ethnographic research on everyday nationalism in Cluj, Transylvania. Their
research showed that, despite the best efforts of nationalist politicians, ethnic
identity had low salience for many ordinary folk in Cluj. It likewise revealed
how unconscious behaviours, such as attending particular churches or hiring
employees from one's social network, reproduce structures of ethnic division
(Brubaker 1996: 281, 285, 297).
Complexity theory argues that large causes (i.e. political agitation) can have
limited effects (weak mass nationalist response), while small causes (such as a
local incident) may result in dramatic effects. In the case of Cluj, the repeated
provocations of the Romanian nationalist mayor failed to inspire mass
fervour. In other cases, however, initially small movements set feedback
loops in train that produce large effects. David Laitin observes that the
direction of assimilation in the newly independent ex-Soviet republics differs
widely, with the dynamics of change resembling a ‘tipping game’. Change
may begin slowly, then suddenly accelerate into a cascade as titular languages
such as Estonian breach a threshold level of penetration. People pay attention
not only to nationalist exhortation or incentives but to what they believe their
peers are up to. As the use of Estonian rises beyond a tipping point, this
increases the practical advantages of learning Estonian but, more importantly,
the perception others will switch to it, driving a self-fulﬁlling feedback (Laitin
1998: 21–30).
Brubaker and colleagues focus on emergence and Laitin on nonlinearity
and feedback loops. All are connected aspects of complexity theory. Grasping
these network dynamics and properties enriches our understanding of the
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horizontal-vertical organisational axis that bisects the modernist-
ethnosymbolist dimension of nationalism theory. Complexity theory thus
enables historians and social scientists to make better sense of their data,
scrutinising empirical cases for evidence of emergence, feedback loops, tipping
points and distributed information.
Complexity theory and nations
In the 1990s, there was a growing awareness that many phenomena in the nat-
ural world could be better addressed through Complex Adaptive Systems
(CAS) theory than linear Newtonian approaches (Capra 1996; Gell-Mann
1994). Complexity theory originally stemmed from natural science, where,
for example, the rate of temperature increase in the world's climate or changes
in the size of ﬁsh stocks seemed to change erratically, eluding incrementalist
modelling techniques. Established methods were based on linear assumptions
– estimating the effect of adding additional inputs to a model to point-predict
a marginal change in the outcome of interest. Instead, as with the sudden, puz-
zling, collapse of Atlantic cod stocks, threshold conditions meant that small
causes could produce large effects. Diminished ﬁsh stocks bedded down as a
new equilibrium despite a plentiful food supply, which should have heralded
a rebound to previous population levels. Complexity theory has also been
adopted in the social sciences. Markets and cities, for instance, are cited as in-
stances of complex systems whose whole represents more than the sum of its
parts: macro dynamics cannot be reconstructed by aggregating the behaviour
of ‘typical’ inhabitants (Urry 2005; Walby 2007).
It is not the intention of this paper to recapitulate the literature on complex-
ity theory in the social sciences, which is well summarised elsewhere (Bousquet
and Curtis 2011; Urry 2005). The connection between complexity and nation-
alism is also not entirely uncharted territory. Cederman (1997) uses agent-
based modelling to examine how larger states are formed from smaller ones
– as with Germany – and how nations toggle between ethnic and civic forms
of nationalism depending on the relative size of their component ethnic groups.
Mock explores how cognitive-affective networks bind individuals into larger
systems of national identity, whereby individuals' emotional attachment to
symbols reinforces macro-level representations (Mock and Homer-Dixon
2015: 10–1). Nations emerge through lower-level interactions.
Previous scholarship is germane to this work, but what follows is distinctive
in several respects. First, it attempts to encapsulate and recast many extant
‘bottom-up’ critiques of nationalism theory within the rubric of Complexity.
For the purposes of the study of nationalism, I identify the following relevant
features of complex adaptive systems:
1. Emergence – the idea that a complex system is not controlled from a
central node but instead emerges from the interaction of
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interdependent parts on the basis of a small number of coordinating
rules. The emphasis is on self-organisation from below into a complex
whole. A ﬂock of birds is not controlled by the lead bird but has a
direction and collective behaviour – in response to predators, for in-
stance – because all birds follow a similar set of simple rules, notably
avoiding predators and ﬂying equidistant to surrounding birds. The
ﬂock does not possess a common goal or direction to which each bird
is oriented. Pedestrian trafﬁc patterns furnish an example from the so-
cial world.
2. Feedback loops – the Amazonian rain forest is the source, through evapo-
ration, of most of its own precipitation. Likewise, the greenhouse effect
operates as clouds trap heat, melting ice caps and releasing methane, which
increases solar absorption, adding atmospheric thickness, further trapping
heat and so on. Feedbacks may be negative, as when an animal gets hot
and sweats to reduce body temperature, or positive, as with the greenhouse
effect or an epidemic, in which effects spur on causes that accelerate the ef-
fect, causing the system to spiral out of control. A ‘viral’ trend in fashion
offers a sociological example.
3. Threshold Effects or ‘Tipping Points’ – sometimes long periods of stasis are
punctuated by sudden changes, which cannot be readily explained as the
outcome of discrete causes. When water boils with the addition of one de-
gree of heat at 99°C, or a ﬁnal sand grain causes a mound to collapse, a
small cause, which could not be predicted, leads to a dramatic effect. A
collapse of morale in an army after the latest in a series of incremental set-
backs provides a social example.
4. Distributed Information, i.e. the ‘wisdom of crowds’ (Surowiecki 2004) –
here the ‘brain’ of the system is distributed widely across its compo-
nents, each of which possesses a different perspective that when aggre-
gated produces a more effective entity than would be possible in a
centrally directed system. In the ecosystem, knowledge is contained
through the trial-and-error evolutionary trajectories of various species
in relation to each other. In social systems, this takes place through
the reﬂections and interactions of individuals in relation to each other
and the whole. Markets are often used as a paradigm case of how
harnessing the distributed knowledge of consumers and producers better
satisﬁes individualistic human demands than a system of central alloca-
tion in which planners are only able to draw on partial information and
expertise. This is not to defend the market against the charge that it
generates inequality, pollution and other social ills because it cannot
produce public goods. Rather, the point is that it has greater informa-
tion-processing capacity and can therefore better tailor private goods
to individual desires – for good or ill – than a centrally controlled
system.
I will address each of these interconnected aspects in turn.
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Emergence
National identity: from production to consumption
The classic modernist work on nationalism, notably that of Ernest Gellner
(1983), assumes that national identity is an elite-led phenomenon that accom-
panies the rise of the modern state. It is orchestrated, controlled and coordi-
nated. This holds as much for ‘Megalomanian’ state elites as ‘Ruritanian’
counter-state elites on the periphery reacting to their blocked upward mobility.
The focus is on nationalist productions, such as monuments or school texts,
rather than the way they are received or ‘consumed’ by the average person.
The state, in Gellner's words, ‘creates nations where they do not exist’, and
the entire panoply of the state – education, mass conscription, bureaucracy –
is pressed into the service of a singular national vision (Gellner 1983: 48–9).
Though beginning at the centre, nationalism diffuses outwards from core to
periphery, from elites down the social scale. Peasants are remade into
Frenchmen, to use Weber's (1976) phrase, as the nation is disseminated across
a premodern landscape of self-contained local and regional attachments. Just
as the national language is standardised and dialects fade, provincial or minor-
ity identities give way to a homogeneous national worldview based on key
founding myths such as the French Revolution. Weber was of course alive to
the importance of local conditions, citing popular resistance to taxation and
conscription in the French periphery to show how incomplete the process
was until the twentieth century (Weber 1976: 106–7).
Vertical theories of national diffusion did not go unchallenged. Hobsbawm,
as noted, ﬂagged this as a weakness in Gellner's argument. The late Fredrik
Barth also wrote eloquently of the way ethnic boundaries are locally
reproduced in ‘complex poly-ethnic systems’ with assimilation possible in some
situations but not in others. Ethnicity emerges from interactions between
neighbouring ethnic groups (feedback loops) that iteratively solidify bound-
aries. Elite construction and dissemination play a relatively limited role (Barth
[1969] Barth 1998: 21). Empirical research in history and the social sciences in
the past two decades have similarly exposed the shortcomings of top-down
conceptions. Michael Billig's important work on banal nationalism opened
the door to examining the often routine, mundane, vernacular, mass reproduc-
tion of national understandings, with private media rather than the state
playing the signature role (Billig 1995). This has given rise to a focus on ‘every-
day’ nationalism, which privileges horizontal over vertical relationships, mass
over high culture, the contemporary over the traditional, decentredness rather
than state centralism. Tim Edensor, whose work exempliﬁes the new genre,
speaks of ‘ﬂows, processes…and “horizontal” interconnections, rather
than…vertical, hierarchical structures’ as central to national identity (Edensor
2002: 30).
He ﬁnds modernist theorists of nationalism overly statist but also faults
ethnosymbolist theory for privileging the traditional and historical over the
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contemporary and the high or folk culture over mass-cultural modes of expres-
sion (Edensor 2002, ch. 1). National identities, according to theorists of the
everyday, resemble forests – an oft-cited example of a complex system – more
than centrally directed machines: ‘Some branches wither, are renewed,
transplanted or emerge....these ongoing processes all feed back into each other,
consolidating the apparent naturalness of modes of understanding and
enacting national identity.’ These connections create a ‘dense series of
associations between spaces, acts, things and forms of representation’ to offer
countless different ways of expressing identity (Edensor 2002: vii). In other
words, national identity is like a forest, emerging from peer-to-peer ﬂows
and feedbacks more than via state direction, especially in our post-industrial,
democratic age.
Yves Deloye draws our attention to the ‘invisibility’ of national reproduc-
tion; Edensor stresses its unreﬂexive nature. Microsocial practices – inhabiting
an environment with national styles of vernacular architecture, listening to
characteristically national music, watching a national sport, consuming na-
tional brands of automobile, matter more than participating in occasional
bursts of state nationalism such as national days. Deloye speaks of the spread
of national identity along ‘various, ambiguous lines, based on largely uncon-
scious processes…without easily identiﬁable actors. What is at stake here is
the emergence of a national identiﬁcation that is on the whole an unintended
result’ (Deloye 2013: 617–8). When taken-for-granted circuits of habit and in-
terpretation among, say, white Englishmen, are problematised by the arrival of
immigrants who do not share their localised cultural practices and understand-
ings, a feeling of dissonance may result. This produces ontological insecurity
among the newly self-conscious majority group. Such crises may fuel the suc-
cess of anti-immigration parties or street movements, whose fortunes cannot
simply be ascribed to far right entrepreneurs but are rooted in the horizontal
interactions that underpin contemporary national identity in advanced liberal
democracies (Skey 2011). A parallel example of emergent organisation and
identity, from the religio-political sphere, is the ‘leaderless jihad’ of movements
such as Al Qaeda or ISIL (Bousquet 2012; Sageman 2008).
Though some theorists of nationalism, notably ethnosymbolists, were
aware of the problem of resonance – the failure of national appeals to take root
by winning the affections of the masses – the production of meaning was still
conceived as elite-driven (Smith 2009: 31–2, 71–2; Ozkirimli 2003: 348–50).1
Moreover, as Turner classically pointed out, symbols are multivocal (Eriksen
2007; Turner 1967, 1975), with individuals interpreting signiﬁers such as the
British ﬂag differently depending on their situation. The Union Jack has
served, for instance, as both a playful symbol of the 1960s Mod counterculture
and an emblem of the fascist National Front (Edensor 2002: 26). Fox
foregrounds the polysemic nature of national ritual performances: the range
of responses to ofﬁcial events such as Bastille Day runs from indifference
through to intense patriotic fervour while the neoclassical allusions of nine-
teenth century statuary are lost on contemporary audiences (Fox 2014).
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The classical phrase used to encapsulate the nation is Benedict Anderson's
term ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983). Following Anderson's lead,
historical sociologists debating the question of when nations arose in history
repeatedly stress common imagining as the litmus test of nationhood (Leoussi
et al. 2006). This needs to be examined. Flocks of birds or schools of ﬁsh act in
unison, but no individual imagines the whole or possesses a master plan. The
whole cannot be read off an individual part. Each follows simple rules, out
of which emerges a complex unity. When a collection of people who cooperate
with some and avoid others on the basis of limited rules such as sharing an
intelligible dialect, the entity may behave like an ethnic group even if it is
unconscious of the whole. Members need not possess a clear consciousness
of where the ethnic group's boundaries rest or agree on a common set of myths
and memories for it to act in unison.
This problematises the importance of ‘imagined community’ and common
consciousness that many theorists point to as a sine qua non of ethnicity and
nationhood (Connor 1994: 103). I do not claim that most nations arose
spontaneously, which would be absurd. At the same time, a recognition of
the role of peer-to-peer, or village-to-village, interactions in which religion
and language structured cooperation, could help to explain why Armstrong
(1982) sees European ethnic groups (‘nations before nationalism’) forming
along the boundaries between language families and religions. These are
precisely the forces that would have structured micro-level interactions,
communication and social boundaries from which ‘nation’-like behaviour
could emerge and onto which subsequent nationalist elites could project their
emerging collective consciousness, ﬁnding resonance for their constructions.
Brubaker (1996) likewise refer to the way Romanians and Hungarians in Cluj,
simply by ‘unconsciously’ attending different churches and hiring among those
they trust in intimate familial and friendship networks help reproduce
ethnicity. The causes of this behaviour are not ethnic, but the effects reproduce
structures that abet ethnic consciousness.
Complexity theory is linked to a horizontal–vertical network dimension of
theory that is orthogonal to the modernism-ethnosymbolism debate.
Ethnosymbolism stresses the importance of subjective myths and symbols that
are reproduced in premodern populations by religious institutions, dynasts,
sects, itinerant poets and performers (Armstrong 1982; Smith 1986; Hastings
1997; Gat 2012). While this spread of consciousness is compatible with emer-
gence, complexity also allows for ‘ﬂock-like’ unconscious coordination to
emerge in the absence of shared consciousness – a phenomenon upon which
ethnosymbolism is silent. If, in the premodern German lands, speakers of Ger-
manic dialects cooperated more often with speakers of other distinct but intel-
ligible Germanic dialects than with their neighbours who spoke Latin or Slavic
dialects, this could form the basis of ‘ethnic’-like boundaries. Large-scale pat-
terns of conﬂict and cooperation could emerge from the microdynamics of lo-
cales even if the locals in question were unaware of the wider pattern of
‘ethnicity’ emerging from the sum of their local interactions.
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This is not to question the fact that conﬂict often occurred within cultures
and could cut across linguistic lines. For instance, the Conquistadors had
native allies in their wars against Atahualpa or Cuahtemoc. Yet at the same
time one may also speak of White-Indian conﬂict in the United States prior
to the rise of a nationwide ‘American Indian’ imagined community in the late
1800s (Tucker et al. 2011: 806). American Indians were not an ethnic
community in the sense of sharing common myths and symbols (Smith
1991). However, they exhibited ‘ethnic’ emergent properties arising,
‘ﬂock-like’, from the sum of myriad local struggles against the encroachment
of white settlers. Local cooperation with other Indian tribes did not extend
to a nationwide movement and consciousness, linked by associations and print
communication, until the late 1800s. Yet one may still denote an ‘emergent’
Indian ‘ﬂock’ at a higher scale, produced by a pattern of local conﬂict with
whites and cooperation among Indian tribes. This represents something more
than a series of isolated local phenomena, even if it falls short of fully
conscious ethnicity.
The local and the national
Where classical nationalism theory tells a story of gemeinschaft yielding to
gesellschaft, and premodern localism giving way to homogeneous nationalism,
emergence sustains a different interpretation of events in which locals serve as
active agents in the co-production of nations. This is vital because, as
Malesevic (2013: 15, 20, 42) notes, nation-states are often distant and abstract
and must be woven into the micro-solidarities that generate emotional
attachment and feelings of solidarity. Once locales – the parts – come to think
of themselves as intertwined with the nation – the whole – localism energises
rather than obstructs national identity. One is both a Liverpudlian and
English, Gascon and French, and the two come to be mutually reinforcing.
Social historians show that cities and regions interpreted, shaped and acceler-
ated the spread of the state's ‘invented traditions’. National celebrations in the
nineteenth century were grafted onto pre-existing civic traditions to provide a
continuous local narrative.
The city fathers of Hamburg, for instance, steeped in local legends of a
glorious Hanseatic past, championed Germany as a great seafaring nation in
the 1880–1900 period, a country with a trading past ﬁt for a future of saltwater
imperialism (Umbach 2006: 64–6). By contrast, in Pfalz, near the border with
France, locals during World War I recalled their long pre-Uniﬁcation history
of resisting French aggression, reaching back to the Thirty Years War and
Louis XIV. Their past became a German past. Following the disaster of World
War II, Pfalzers distanced themselves from Nazism as a Prussian project and
recalled an alternative version of local lore in which Pfalz served as a site of
Franco-German interchange. Again, the local past was pressed into the service
of German national identity, with the region a cradle of German democracy
(Applegate 1990: 89–90, 241–4).
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The so-called heimat version of the nation involves locals peering at the na-
tional canon through a decidedly local lens (Conﬁno 1997). Many national
myths emerged ﬁrst as local urban myths, to be copied and adopted by other
locales. A statue of Joan of Arc, for instance, was erected in Orleans as early
as 1458, and she was the focal point for local pride until the 1840s, when she
emerged as a national ﬁgure in part through popularisation by Jules Michelet's
Jeanne D'Arc (1841). Often the pattern took the form of inter-city contagion
rather than central adoption, as with, for example, the spread of the Floral
Games in the Catalan-Provencal border region, later appropriated by Catalan
nationalists (Leerssen 2015). In frontier regions, new borders were
superimposed on what were formerly local differences. Nations subsequently
served as resources that were used by locals on each side of the border to
juxtapose themselves against their arch-rivals. As Sahlins writes of a
Spanish-French border region, national belonging ‘appeared less as a result
of state intentions than from a local process of adopting and appropriating
the nation…At once opposing and using the state for its own ends, local
society brought the nation into the village’ (Sahlins 1989: 9).
Bottom-up emergence is energised by locales that interact and interpret
national symbolism in distinct ways. Local branches of non-state entities –
patriotic societies and fraternities – often organise national celebrations. This
is especially true in societies with a weak central administration. The United
States lacked a strong federal centre prior to the Civil War and had little activ-
ist bureaucracy prior to the New Deal era of the 1930s. To say America lacked
national identity is, however, a misnomer. National identity and symbols were
interpreted in manifold ways by a multiplicity of actors. The lack of a national
centre did not detract from national unity except during the Civil War. The
nation served as an idiom, or symbolic ‘zone of conﬂict’, which contending
regional or ideological fragments wrestled over and, in so doing, reinforced
(Hutchinson 2005).
In the northern states from the 1880s, associations such as the Grand Army
of the Republic (GAR) and Women's Relief Corps (WRC) organised Fourth
of July celebrations while in the South this fell to the United Confederate
Veterans (UCV) and United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC). Patriotic
societies combined regional foci – tending civil war graves, for instance, or
building monuments to civil war leaders – with national parades and celebra-
tions (Kammen 1991; O'Leary 1999). As these associations were chapter-
based, local heroes seamlessly strode a wider, national stage. Souvenirs created
by private entrepreneurs on their own initiative spread nationalist iconography
within the population. Out of this disparate everyday nationalism rose a sense
of national identity no less cogent than that of more state-directed nations such
as Third Republic France. An Asian analogy is the way Philippine nationalism
developed in distinction to that of Thailand. Whereas Thai nationalism was
Bangkok-centric and focused on the person of the king, ‘the Philippines was
always conspicuously lacking in the kind of Archimedean point from which
an avowedly neutral institutionalized embodiment of the national interest
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could be articulated....diffuse and demotic, [it] began to emerge “from below”
in the Philippines through popular representations and struggles styled as
“Filipino”’ (Sidel 2013: 474–5).
Feedback loops and tipping points
Fredrik Barth wrote of how Pathan or Lapp identity varied from place to
place, with assimilation possible in some regions more than others. Ethnic
boundaries came to be reinforced in interaction with other groups. Identity
claims (including shifts) that are accepted by other groups in turn reinforce
those identities in what Barth termed a ‘self-fulﬁlling’ process (Barth [1969]
1998: 28). We next consider the effect of these self-fulﬁlling feedback loops
whose runaway properties result in tipping behaviour. Another instance of
positive feedback is that nations, once created, socialise new generations into
their symbolism. Nation-states generate incentives – such as honours and
ofﬁces – to support their maintenance in what Stinchcombe (1968:112) terms
an ‘inﬁnite loop’, even when they may no longer be economically or militarily
functional. Other nations use the label, reinforcing its use. Indeed, nations
today are probably maintained more by these feedbacks than economic and
military imperatives, which may well favour a globalised network of city-states
and empires (Ohmae 1995). The reproduction of the nation is only checked by
material or external shocks.
The expansion of nations furnishes a further instance of positive feedback.
A rarely explored but often tacit view in the nationalism literature is that
nationalist ideas spread smoothly from intellectual centres to regional elites
within empires (Gellner's Ruritanians) or to native intellectuals such as
Nyerere or Gandhi in overseas colonies. These ﬁgures subsequently spearhead
secessionist and independence movements. A great deal of emphasis is placed
on coteries of intellectuals, educated in the metropole, who establish national-
ist organisations and journals.
But what were the network dynamics? How did ideas of nationalism
spread? Did intellectuals in metropolitan centres communicate ideas of nation-
alism to literate individuals who preached it in public, as part of a top-down
network, or might there also be important horizontal, peer-to-peer dynamics?
In common with other social sciences, the focus in nationalism theory is on
structural preconditions rather than short-run dynamics (Biggs 2005), yet the
latter are vital for determining whether nationalist movements actually
materialise in fertile situations. It could be argued that it takes time for new
worldviews to spread: the diffusion of nationalist ideas in Hroch's ([1985]
2000) phase A, or the emergence of nationalist organisations in his phase B,
emerges as much through ‘viral’ peer-to-peer networking as top-down print
capitalism. Like an epidemic, the more who become attached to an idea, the
more vectors for its spread, until a tipping point is reached. David Laitin's
aforementioned assimilationist cascade, in which members of minorities
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suddenly switch from the imperial language to their vernacular once a
threshold is passed, offers further evidence (Laitin 1998: 21–30). This is
especially marked in societies prior to the development of mass literacy. For
Leerssen this helps explain, among other phenomena, the spread of national-
ism in societies with weak communications infrastructure such as Catholic
Ireland from 1750–1825 and the occurrence of sudden paradigm shifts such
as the appearance of historicism around 1800.2
Nationalist agitation and, especially, secession, create role models that
further embolden others. Thus, the creation of new nations inspires the
thoughts and deeds of others, even as the will of existing states or interna-
tional actors may enable or stanch the process. Contagion is especially likely
if potential secessionists see successful secessionist kin in nearby countries
(Ayres and Saideman 2000). Assumptions about the smooth, linear spread
of ideas, or of nationalist movements, should be recast in light of tipping
dynamics.
The same is true of nationalist violence. In the Nagorno–Karabakh conﬂict,
killing was often spontaneous rather than organised, with nationalist elites
reacting to, rather than leading, the ﬂow of events. Rumours fed into the Sum-
gait episode, which sparked a spiral of tit-for-tat Armenian–Azeri violence that
subsequently escalated (Voronkova 2012). While many genocides are orches-
trated by the state, others, such as the Rwandan genocide in which up to a
third of Hutu men may have been involved, display important aspects of
peer-to-peer contagion. Donald Horowitz (2001) draws our attention to the
often spontaneous quality of ethnic riots as violence begets violence, a classic
case of a positive feedback loop.
In recent Irish history, the 1916 Easter Rising is viewed as a turning point,
after which armed Irish separatism took centre stage. Yet it is often forgotten
that Irish Catholics strongly supported the First World War effort while their
response to the Easter Rising was not immediate. The efforts of Irish
Republicans to stir the population were continually frustrated. What appears
to have occurred is a largely invisible rise of popular political nationalism,
much like the early stages of an epidemic prior to tipping (Githens-Mazer
2006). While print capitalism played a role, so too did the logarithmic, peer-
to-peer transmission of nationalist sentiment within the Irish population.
By contrast, the decades prior to the Easter Rising were a period in which
nationalist agitation fell on deaf ears. Likewise, the IRA's Border Campaign
of 1956–1962 in Northern Ireland was an abject failure despite a host of
favourable conditions (discrimination, poverty, organisation). Deliberate ef-
forts failed to register an effect. A complexity approach would suggest that
nationalist sentiment had yet to cross its tipping point in the network of
Northern Irish Catholics. Seven years later, however, there was a completely
different popular response as the IRA's campaign took off, supported by ris-
ing numbers of local volunteers. Here again, while there were important
events such as Civil Rights marches and police crackdowns, there was no sin-
gle trigger, opening up the possibility of an initially slow spread of republican
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sympathy along isolated networks followed by an organic, sudden, virus-like
bloom of activity.
Brubaker (1996) likewise reveal how nationalist sentiment remained latent
rather than salient in Cluj because the pool of Romanians animated by na-
tional chauvinism remained below the critical mass necessary to spark a chain
reaction of mobilisation and counter-mobilisation. Empirical investigation
into the spread of online petitions shows that many movements meet this fate:
most fail with just a tiny fraction achieving mass penetration. Herding behav-
iour is important: less committed signatories who agree with the petition must
be convinced that their peers are signing up before they will endorse it (Yasseri
et al. 2013). The role of herding introduces a feedback loop to the process,
much as Laitin describes with respect to the importance of whether the public
perceives that minority languages will become more widely used in the future,
which drives self-fulﬁlling behaviour.
The organisation of networks may affect whether messages cross a thresh-
old: studies show that individuals are more likely to be converted to a cause
if approached through several social connections. Hence, success is only partly
a function of the intrinsic appeal of a petition and the resources behind it. It
also results from the shape of the network and whether the message reaches
key individuals who bridge multiple networks. Thus, even a resonant, well-
resourced message may fail to catch on if it is marooned in outlying parts of
the network (Yasseri et al. 2013). Future research should, where possible,
attempt to identify the horizontal network dynamics that inhibit or enable
the spread of national constructions and programmes.
Distributed information
Earlier we noted the polysemic, multivocal nature of national symbols and the
fact that the content of national identity varies from locale to locale. A wide
variety of individual and local identities may inadvertently generate ethnic
groups like the Lapps or power social movements such as nineteenth century
Czech nationalism at a higher level of aggregation. Likewise, diverse local
understandings of a common symbol such as a ﬂag, or referent such as
France, emerge as a higher-order French national identity. This highlights
the fourth aspect of complexity: distributed information.
The power of distributed information, popularised by New York Times
journalist Thomas Surowiecki's book The Wisdom of Crowds, is used to
explain why markets function better than central planning in providing private
goods. When Boris Yeltsin visited Randall's Supermarket in Houston in 1989,
he was transﬁxed by the choice on offer. ‘When I saw those shelves crammed
with hundreds, thousands of cans, cartons and goods of every possible sort,
for the ﬁrst time I felt quite frankly sick with despair for the Soviet people’,
he wrote (Allison and Beschel 1992). Yeltsin may have overlooked the market's
failure to provide public goods such as health care to poor Texans, but its
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superior capacity to slake private desires could not be doubted. How is it that
stores in Houston manage to stock roughly the right amount of milk and other
perishable products each day to meet an extremely varied set of demands from
individuals across many different locations in the city?
The answer is that markets are able to harness the distributed knowledge of
individuals. Every person is both consumer and producer and has a different
perspective on what they can supply and what their and others' demands are.
The price mechanism acts to aggregate their variegated specialist knowledge,
pooling this distributed knowledge to regulate what is produced, how much,
where and for whom. Few would contest that such a system works better to
produce private goods than one based on central control, which cannot know
the tastes and capacities of millions of individuals in diverse niches nor
coordinate production and distribution to effectively meet constantly shifting
patterns of demand. In short, a ‘spontaneous order’ emerging from complexity
has greater information processing power than a centrally directed order
where knowledge is focused among expert planners. We see this in other
spheres such as guessing the number of beans in a jar, where the aggregate
of everyone's guess consistently approaches or beats the best guess or when
betting markets routinely offer superior predictions to experts (Surowiecki
2004; Hayek 1994: 6).
The principle of distributed information may be applied to national identity
insofar as it can, like supply and demand, only be known by aggregating
individuals' distinct perspectives. In effect one cannot speak of ‘the’ national
identity, nor need it reside in a ﬁxed set of symbols even though in some cases
a cardinal mythomoteur (Smith 1986) such as the French Revolution or
Arab–Israeli war will have a hold upon the affections of many. When Marks
and Spencer, a British supermarket chain, asked customers to write one thing
they liked best about Britain, they received well over a thousand different
responses, from the monarchy to Cox's Orange Pippin apples (Edensor 2002:
175). In this sense, central planners of national identity who attempt to deﬁne
the national hymn sheet are unlikely to minister to popular demand any more
effectively than Soviet functionaries.
‘Personal nationalism’, Anthony Cohen's brilliant phrase, echoes the same
idea. In discussing Scottish nationalism, he notes how geographically,
religiously, economically, regionally and ethnically diverse Scotland is. The
‘histories, literatures, folklores, traditions, languages, musics, landscapes, and
foods of Scotland’ are social facts that individuals use to construct their
personal visions of the nation. ‘Though these items may be interpreted
differently, it is on the sharing of them that the sentiment of and attachment
to the nation is predicated’, he adds. Indeed, individuals are often not
‘conscious of the individuality of their nationalisms’, and politicians who seek
to harness national sentiment must espouse a capacious version of nationalism
in which all can see themselves. This said, Cohen admits that illiberal
nations do not permit such latitude, and, where the state has ﬁrm control,
complexity is a less useful framework. Yet resistance is possible, as
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NiraYuval-Davis (2011: 6, 180) points out in her notion of the situated as
opposed to hegemonic gaze. For instance, minorities or women often perceive
the nation differently from the hegemonic white male norm. As Cohen's
summarises, ‘Nations obviously differ in the extent to which they permit the
assertion of differing versions of themselves, and in the power with which they
attempt to press individuals into a national matrix. As we know, there are
countries in which individuals are compelled to stand in massed ranks to recite
in unison a nationalist litany’ (Cohen 1996: 804–5).
We saw that locale is one lens through which individuals may view the
nation, accounting for differences in perceptions of national identity.
John Hutchinson (2005) draws our attention to further dimensions of
difference, remarking that competing ideological and class fragments inﬂect
national myths in distinct ways. In eighteenth and early nineteenth century
Britain, Whigs identiﬁed with the Anglo-Saxons, held to be the ancestors of
the free yeomanry, while Tories looked to the Normans, founders of the royal
dynasty, as the nation's ethnic ancestors. A reprise of this antinomy was played
out in the American civil war with northerners favouring Anglo-Saxon
yeoman-republican ancestors, southerners a Norman Cavalier myth
(VanHoosier-Carey 1997); so too in France with the liberal Gauls and aristo-
cratic Franks. At a more basic level, those in less privileged positions tended to
identify with popular revolutions and protest episodes in the national past
while the privileged looked to the established church or aristocratic traditions.
The fact that all sides of the political and social spectrum spoke in the idiom of
nationhood was, however, important, in that competition over the meaning of
nationhood reinforced rather than weakened it. Unity emerges from a chaotic
diversity with the common idiom of nationhood – proper name, ﬂag – serving
a similar aggregating role to prices in a marketplace. If contending political
forces championed separate identity projects without reference to the nation,
diversity could not produce unity, and no higher order could emerge from
lower-level chaos.
Locale, class, ideology and ethnicity are not the only vantage points from
which the nation is glimpsed. Gender, psychology, lifestyle and other lenses
similarly refract the national image, focusing attention on alternative symbolic
resources and usable pasts depending on the individual (Kaufmann 2008). This
exempliﬁes the notion of distributed information: no two individuals are
located in exactly the same ethnic, geographic, gender or psychological space.
They peer at the nation from unique angles, resulting in different national
identities, as Cohen and Yuval-Davis note.
Individuals' national identities may rotate from symbol to symbol as they
transit from their home region to a capital city and thence to other countries
– a voyage that leads them to perceive their nation differently. The shift is from
a local nationalism partly oriented against the centre to an outward-facing
national ‘brand’ emerging through interactions with other nation-states. The
latter cleaves more closely to the ofﬁcial version of national identity than the
former but should not be privileged as ‘the’ national identity.
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Whatever the individual's ethnic origin, the proper name and focal point for
their national identity remains the nation rather than their ethnic, faith or
lifestyle communities. This, therefore, is not a description of multi-ethnic
statehood in which distinct ethnic groups recognise a common civic national
identity but rather a situation in which different individuals and ethnic groups
identify deeply but differentially with a manifold range of ‘national’ symbols.
Difference energises rather than detracts from nationalism. This
‘crowdsourced nationalism’ means that individuals in civil society, more than
state elites, become the repository of national identity. Thus, the nation as a
whole is characterised by a thoroughgoing multivocalism in which multiple
national identities interact – often seamlessly – within the same nation.
Emergence from below may be more important than top-down orchestration
by elites.
Multivocalism as normative stance?
This article has focused on complexity theory as a way of making sense of a
series of contemporary critiques of nationalism theory. Yet it is also possible
to view multivocalism as a route for navigating between competing arguments
over multiculturalism, cosmopolitan individualism and liberal nationalism. If
national identity in stable liberal societies is highly personalised, then states
that recognise this complexity by desisting from a prescriptive deﬁnition of
the nation (Cohen's ‘nationalist litany’) are in a better position to advance both
the liberty and loyalty of their citizens (Kaufmann 2016). Even where variants
of national identity openly compete, this strengthens rather than fragments the
nation as each side uses the idiom of nationhood to narrate their sectional
aspirations (Hutchinson 2005).
Conclusion
This work makes the case for viewing nations as complex systems, not just elite
constructs. Against a classic view which sees national consciousness diffused
from elites down to masses and from centres out to peripheries, complexity
allows for the emergence of national identity from below. States and elites
are important actors but the role of mass publics in the everyday production
and consumption of nations is vital. Complexity theory ﬁnds a common motif
in recent work on everyday nationalism, contested nationalism, multivocality,
personal nationalism, spontaneous ethnic riots, local nationalism and the con-
catenation of cultural movements. However, these disparate discourses have
not been systematically brought together. Extant work has also paid insufﬁ-
cient attention to speciﬁc dynamics such as thresholds, feedbacks or network
shape which complexity theory suggests future empirical researchers should
pay attention to.
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Several key aspects of complex systems – emergence, feedback loops,
tipping points and distributed information – problematise elite-centric views
of the nation. The emergence of nations, or the spread of nationalist ideas,
secession or violence, may resemble viruses that incubate along networks until
they reach a tipping point, rather than blueprints which are deliberately
orchestrated and disseminated by elites. With complex systems, small causes
may result in large effects and vice-versa. This sheds light on the erratic nature
of national awakening, in which long periods of apparent dormancy may be
followed by sudden bursts of activity that cannot be explained by any single
event or critical juncture. Considerable elite agitation or violent events may fail
to raise consciousness while in other cases minor protests may set feedbacks in
train that lead to mass movements.
Emergence helps account for the presence of ‘nation-like’ behaviour before
the age of nationalism and the signiﬁcant overlap between premodern linguis-
tic and religious patterns and modern national boundaries in Europe and
East Asia. It explains why national movements may arise from the ‘bottom-up’
interactions of private associations, leisure providers and the media rather than
the deliberate efforts of state elites. National identity, except in the most
centralised and authoritarian states, is distributed within individuals in a pop-
ulation such that the collective representation of the nation cannot be read off
ofﬁcial documents or a single individual. This accounts for the often puzzling,
elusive quality of national identity in liberal nation-states. This ‘wisdom of
crowds’ understanding of national identity may even be extended to the
normative sphere, suggesting states should embrace a multivocal form of
nationalism that can simultaneously advance both the liberty and loyalty of
its citizens.
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Endnotes
1 Conspicuous failures include movements for Occitanian, Padanian or indigenous ‘Cruithin’
Ulster-Protestant identity (i.e. Adamson, [1982] Adamson 1991). Post-colonial nationalism,
notably in sub-Saharan Africa, has generally failed to supplant ethnic loyalties in salience (Smith
1983). According to Afrobarometer surveys, most sub-Saharan Africans privilege ethnic over
national identities, though there are exceptions such as Tanzania where national identity holds ﬁrst
place in people's affections. See http://www.afrobarometer.org/, merged data for Rounds 1–4.
2 Personal communication with Joep Leerssen, 8 May 2014.
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